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1. Phasing out Aristotle 
 
The shift from commentary to textbooks during the last decades of the Six-
teenth century had a standpoint in the work of the jesuit philosopher and theo-
logian Benito Perera (Benedictus Pererius, Benito Pereyra, 1535-1610), who 
taught at the Collegium Romanum for a very long while1. 
This shift followed the gradual declining of Aristotle as the main auctoritas in 
universities’ philosophy. For centuries, his authority had been based not only on 
the substance of the things he had stated in his books, but also on the order of 
reasoning that he had observed in dealing with the issues inside and between 
his works.  
The Fifteenth century reception of the greek codes in Italy triggered a relentless 
philological activity that raised a widespread unsatisfaction toward the medie-
val translations of Aristotle’s works. At the beginning of the Sixteenth century, 
new editions in greek and latin were provided and followed by a longlasting 
                                           
1 Unfortunately, the proceedings of the Conference “Benet Perera (Pererius, 1535-1610). Un ge-
suita rinascimentale al crocevia della modernità. A Renaissance Jesuit on the Threshold of Modernity” 
(Pontificia Università Gregoriana, 13-14 Dec. 2014, organized by M. Lamanna) were not yet 
available when I gave this paper at this conference. They would have shed more light on the 
issue I handle here. 




debate on the meaning (as originally intended by Aristotle) of this or that word, 
proposition, or passage. 
As Schmitt has pointed out, the invention of print fueled the diversity between 
Aristotle texts, in such a way that a scholar might feel the “real” Aristotle had 
being shattered by that mess of printed versions. In a word, one could build his 
own Aristotle, and blame the others’ one for being untrue and unfaithful, as 
well2.  
This was true for the ones who still considered themselves to be followers of Ar-
istotle. But, what about Aristotle’s own relation to truth? 
Pomponazzi’s affair had challenged the Christianized version of Aristotle on 
which Thomas Aquinas’ system was based. The V Lateran Council forced Chris-
tian philosophers to defend that version, fighting against the double truth theo-
ry and providing rational argumentations to state the link between faith, theolo-
gy and philosophy3.  
But, as long as the versions conflicted with each other, Aristotle underwent into 
a process that undermined his authority in both substance and method. Of 
course, this process was not steady: like a flag, Aristotle deserved either a strong 
defense or he was to blame, depending on the point of view of the scholar. Aris-
totle became a banner, so did his major interpreter, Averroes. One cannot sketch 
a clear profile of a Sixteenth century Aristotelian, to say nothing of an Averroist, 
but these labels were often used to criticize or to polemize with other scholars.  
It is important to say that challenging Aristotle was not the sole property of the 
platonic humanists, like Erasmus, Vives, Rabelais: nor was it only the champion 
of the empious wordly learned men whom Luther blamed, before being sof-
tened by Melanchton. Aristotle was challenged also in the universities, his own 
                                           
2 SCHMITT 1988. 




realm, because something in his doctrines was trambling, and because his meth-
od was insufficient for a new epistemology.  
Before the substance, the method of Aristotle was exposed to many challenges. 
That is, not only the concept of “method” as it was discussed by Ramus (and de-
fended by Antonio de Gouveia) before the King of France at the middle of the 
Century: that was a mere fact of Logic. It dealt with some logical issues pertain-
ing to the rules of reasoning and distributing the topics in a rhetorical speech. 
The method meant here is that concept of order which, according to Aristotle, 
can be considered as twofold: 1) the order of facing issues scientifically (i.e., 
philosophically); the order of books (i.e., epistemology)4. 
 
2. Following a given order: a Jesuit problem 
 
According to the Constitutions of the Order, the Jesuits were bound to fol-
low Aristotle5 in the philosophical disciplines. And the Ratio Studiorum, which 
was published only in 1599, still maintained this statement. But what did ‘Aris-
totle should be followed’ really mean? 
A fair number of Aristotle’s doctrines were considered empious by the Church, 
including his doctrine on the eternity of the world, and his negation of divine 
providence as well. There is no doubt about the fact that Aristotle believed in 
them and professed them in his works, but there were also some doctrines that 
either seemed to be unclearly stated in his books, or became object of centuries-
old disputation as to their proper interpretation. This was the case, for instance, 
with the unity of the intellect and the immortality of the rational soul. 
                                           
4 On the concepts of ‘method’ and ‘order’ in natural philosophy, see DI LISCIA, KESSLER, ME-
THUEN 1997 and GILBERT 1960. 
5 «In logic, natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and metaphysics, the doctrine of Aristotle 




So, what did the Jesuits have to do with this Aristotle? According to Ignatius, 
who was neither a scholastic philosopher nor had ever been interested in these 
kinds of disputation, they simply had to follow the V Lateran Council’s state-
ment, defending the Christianized version of Aristotle, paradoxically against 
both the ‘aristotelians’ who had theorised the legitimacy of the double truth, as 
Pomponazzi had done, and those Catholic scholars, such as Caietanus, who had 
accepted the idea that Aristotle was not suitable for a Christian philosophy. 
Ignatius cared more that the Jesuits followed the university traditions. Since Ar-
istotle was the pillar of the universities’ pedagogy, he must be respected. Aristo-
tle was more an order than a doctrine, and this order must be followed.  
But, again: What kind of ‘order’? 
 
3. Scholastic definitions 
 
As I said before, centuries of Scholasticism had dwelled on the concept of 
order providing a large, multicolored, variegated number of distinctions for its 
meaning.  What a Sixteenth century scholar would immediately understand by 
the word ‘order’ was likely what Thomas Aquinas had set about three centuries 
earlier, namely the twofold expression ordo doctrinae (or, ordo disciplinae).   
In the fourth Quodlibetal Question, Aquinas addresses the issue of defining a the-
ological question by posing a distinction between two kinds of disputation, one 
which aims to remove any doubt about the fact that the matter does exist, the 
other which he calls ‘magisterial’: 
Disputatio autem ad duplicem finem potest ordinari. Quaedam enim disputa-
tio ordinatur ad removendum dubitationem an ita sit; et in tali disputatione 
theologica maxime utendum est auctoritatibus, quas recipiunt illi cum quibus 
disputatur (…). Si autem nullam auctoritatem recipiunt, oportet ad eos con-
vincendos, ad rationes naturales confugere. Quaedam vero disputatio est 
magistralis in scholis non ad removendum errorem, sed ad instruendum au-
ditores ut inducantur ad intellectum veritatis quam intendit: et tunc oportet 
rationibus inniti investigantibus veritatis radicem, et facientibus scire quomo-




tionem determinet, certificabitur quidem auditor quod ita est, sed nihil scien-
tiae vel intellectus acquiret et vacuus abscedet.6 
 
Someone argued that the entire Summa Theologiae is the supreme example of the 
second type of disputation, since it would seem not to attempt to generate cer-
tainties but rather to foster the understading of certainties that are already 
grasped as such by the assent of faith.7 But this kind of procedure is derived 
from the concept of ‘order’, which is faced as an issue by Aquinas in several 
commentaries to Aristotle’s works. At the very beginning of Ethics, Aquinas dis-
tinguishes four meanings of ‘order’ in relation to human reason: the first one is 
the order of things in nature (ordo naturalium), which the mind can only consid-
er; the second is the order between concepts that the mind gives them through 
its functioning; the other two pertain to the order of the moral actions triggered 
by an act of the mind.8 Each kind of order matches a philosophical science, such 
that the first kind is the subject of both metaphysics and math, the second per-
tains to logic, and so forth.9 
                                           
6 Quodlibet IV, qu. 9, art. 3. 
7 See GORMAN 2000, 150. 
8 «Ordo autem quadrupliciter ad rationem comparatur. Est enim quidam ordo quem ratio non 
facit, sed solum considerat, sicut est ordo rerum naturalium. Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio 
considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa con-
ceptuum, quae sunt voces significativae; tertius autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit 
in operationibus voluntatis. Quartus autem est ordo quem ratio considerando facit in exterio-
ribus rebus, quarum ipsa est causa, sicut in arca et domo» (Sententia Etich., I, 1, 1). 
9 «Et quia consideratio rationis per habitum scientiae perficitur, secundum hos diversos ordi-
nes quos proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae scientiae. Nam ad philosophiam naturalem 
pertinet considerare ordinem rerum quem ratio humana considerat sed non facit; ita quod sub 
naturali philosophia comprehendamus et mathematicam et metaphysicam. Ordo autem quem 
ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est consi-
derare ordinem partium orationis adinvicem, et ordinem principiorum in conclusiones; ordo 
autem actionum voluntariarum pertinet ad considerationem moralis philosophiae. Ordo 
autem quem ratio considerando facit in rebus exterioribus constitutis per rationem humanam, 
pertinet ad artes mechanicas. Sic igitur moralis philosophiae, circa quam versatur praesens in-
tentio, proprium est considerare operationes humanas, secundum quod sunt ordinatae adin-




It should not be surprising that the last consideration led Aquinas to establish 
another distinction about the concept of ‘order’. Indeed, if each science matches 
one of the four kinds of order, there must be a ranking of dignity between them, 
as well as there is in the four kinds of order. It was an epistemological ranking 
which the scholastic scholars would debate into the Seventeenth century. 
In sum, Aquinas distinguishes two different major orders, one pertaining to 
things and one pertaining to mind. While the order of perfect knoweldge reflects 
the order of things (intellectus est rei adequatio), the order of apprehension is quite 
different, because what is prior in nature (quoad se) is not necessarily prior in our 
understanding of it (quoad nos)10. So, according to Aquinas: «(…) iste est natu-
ralis modus sive ordo addiscendi, ut veniatur a nobis notis ad ignota nobis; inde 
est quod oportet nos devenire ex notioribus nobis ad notiora naturae».11  This 
gnoseological belief, which was shared by the majority of the scholastics, is ex-
tremely important for Aquinas’s pedagogy. In De magistro, in fact, Aquinas rec-
ognized that this natural way of proceeding should be a teacher’s main concern. 
In the same book, however, he points out that the student uses two kinds of un-
derstanding: the one by which he follows his teacher’s argumentation (which 
later would be called ordo or modus disciplinae), and the one by which the student 
advances in understanding by means of his own power of argumentation 
(which is called inventio). 
                                           
10 «Et quia prius et notius dicitur dupliciter, scilicet quoad nos, et secundum naturam; dicit 
consequenter quod ea, ex quibus procedit demonstratio, sunt priora et notiora simpliciter et 
secundum naturam, et non quoad nos. Et ad huius expositionem dicit quod priora et notiora 
simpliciter sunt illa, quae sunt remota a sensu ut universalia. Priora autem et notiora quoad 
nos sunt proxima sensui, scilicet singularia, quae opponuntur universalibus, sive oppositione 
prioris et posterioris, sive oppositione propinqui et remoti». (Expositio Posteriorum, I, 4, 15) 
11 In Physic., I, 1, 7. Aquinas’ argument continues as follows: «Notandum autem est quod idem 
dicit nota esse naturae et nota simpliciter. Simpliciter autem notiora sunt, quae secundum se 
sunt notiora. Sunt autem secundum se notiora, quae plus habent de entitate: quia unum-
quodque cognoscibile est inquantum est ens. Magis autem entia sunt, quae sunt magis in actu: 
unde ista maxime sunt cognoscibilia naturae. Nobis autem e converso accidit, eo quod nos 
procedimus intelligendo de potentia in actum; et principium cognitionis nostrae est a sensibi-





What did a Sixteenth century scholar understand, then, when exposed to the 
word ‘order’? 
Basically, the concept meant Aristotle’s order of books. Secondly, the concept of 
‘order’ was twofold. Firstly, it was a way, a method, of inquiry. Secondly, it was 
the way of learning sciences.  
The way of inquiry, in turn, is twofold: one is the way that one follows when he 
is finding something new through speculation, and it is called inventio; the other 
is the way that one follows when he listens to his teacher who is declaring a doc-
trine already known. The learning of sciences is threefold, too. Firstly, it is the 
pedagogical order of sciences, in the sense that one science is linked to another 
according to its propedeuticity, that is, the order from the simpler to the more 
complex. Secondly, it is the ranking of dignity of the sciences: the more a science 
deals with immaterial things, the more it is praiseworthy. Thirdly, it is the rank-
ing of the sciences, according to the certainty of their doctrines. 
 
4. Pererius and his own order 
 
Why is Pererius important for the history of the concept of ordo doctri-
nae/ordo disciplinae? Let me firstly sketch a profile of his career: born in a pueblo 
near Valencia (1535), the city where he joined the Society of Jesus in 1551, he was 
soon called to attend the Roman college, as he was well known for being a bril-
liant student. There, he was charged to teach Rhetoric. His philosophical career 
started in 1558, when he was appointed professor of Physics, which he taught al-
ternatively with Metaphysics and Logic until 1567. During this period, he had to 
face tough attacks from his Rector, Diego de Ledesma, who accused him of 
teaching averroistic doctrines. He finally overcome these difficulties, being ap-




he taught for a long while at the Roman college (1567-1597). He died in 1610, be-
ing hailed as a great learned scholar12. 
He wrote several commentaries on the Holy Scripture and an intriguing brief 
treatise against Astrology (from a “scientific” point of view). Yet, his master-
piece is De communibus omnium naturalium principiis, which he published in 1576 
in Rome.  
This work is not important merely for its doctrines, although some of them did 
have a tremendous impact on the early modern epistemology, particularly in 
German lands. Pererius’ De principiis was also important because of its form. 
Although strongly linked to what it is called “aristotelian physics”, Pererius’ 
way of presenting the issues and argumenting them did not striclty reflect Aris-
totle’s order. This was the very first case in the history of Jesuit philosophy. In-
stead of writing a commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, he arranged the subject in 
a way that he called “rational”. It has been argued that Pererius’ order is heavily 
indebted to the Aristotelian one.13 But the very fact that he advocated for a ra-
tional way to face the issues pertaining to the pillars of a discipline, distinguish-
ing it from Aristotle’s books, stands as evidence that something had broken off.  
Ac licet nobis multas ob causas (quas hoc loco exponere non est necesse) vi-
sum non fuerit Comentarios in Aristotelem scribere, quibus eius sententias & 
verba, sigillatim interpretaremur, sedulo tamen curavimus , ut quicquid Aris-
toteles de rebus, quas hoc opere docemus, usquam sensit, & scriptum reliquit, 
variis ex libris eius colligentes, suo quodque loco pertracteremus.14 
 
What was the order that Pererius would have followed? In the Introduction, he 
states that his work is divided in two parts, the first one dealing with the princi-
ples and causes (principia et causae) of natural things, and the second one facing 
the issue of the common affections shared by all natural things (namely, the cat-
egories like Quantity, Place, Time, and Movement). The two parts take different 
                                           
12 On Pererius’ reputation, see LAMANNA 2009. 
13 See BLUM 2006. 




sizes: the first one is significantly longer than the other (9 books the first, 6 books 
the second). A mere comparison between Aristotle’s Physics and Pererius’ De 
principiis reveals more than a slight difference.   
One can figure out that Pererius’ display of freedom from the Aristotelian order 
was due to the audience to whom the work was addressed. Blum gives a precise 
account of this, identifying the profile of the reader as an Italian scholar, strong-
ly exposed to the platonic and neo-platonic culture triggered by the humanists. 
This argument relies on the fact that Pererius’ lessons at the Roman College 
were strictly bound to the traditional order, that is: 1) reading and exposition of 
the Aristotle’s texts according to the traditional division and enumeration estab-
lished centuries before; and 2) commenting by means of questions respectful of 
the exposition order.  
That is true. Indeed, the manuscripts still extant of Pererius’ courses show his 
respect of the scholastic tradition. 
Yet, Pererius was one of the jesuit philosophers that Ledesma required to write a 
report on the pedagogical issue of how to teach philosophy, in such a way that 
the teaching at the Roman College could be fostered and become the rule for 
every jesuit college in the world. This Superior’s request triggered a significant 
debate within the Roman College, which reached its acme in Ledesma’s con-
demnation of the Averroistic doctrines allegedly professed by Pererius. By re-
sponding to the task given to him by his Superior, Pererius wrote several docu-
ments, over the course of a few years, that are very useful today to understand 
the pedagogical framework at the very base of the order he chose to follow in 
the De principiis.15  
 
First question: was the choice of putting aside Aristotle’s order legitimate in 
dealing with philosophical issues? And, if so, how? In his Brevis ratio studendi, 
                                           




Pererius writes a chapter on the expedient way to teach (Quomodo legere oporteat). 
The beginning of this chapter makes clear that following one order instead of 
another is an individual choice, not an absolute: 
Scriptorum genera duo sunt: Unum eorum qui aliorum sententias suis vel 
scholiis vel commentariis explanant; alterum eorum qui nullius interpreta-
tioni adstricti non alienas, sed suas scriptis exponunt sententias. 16 
 
Pererius lists his suggestions about how to be a good teacher in both cases. Quite 
interestingly, he requires the teacher to be very familiar with the author’s origi-
nal language. Pererius’ knowledge of the ancient languages is well-known. But 
he did not intend this  suggestion as a sort of self-exaltation: on the contrary, this 
belief kept him from being a fan of either one or the other interpreter. Every in-
terpreter of Aristotle, with the exception of Alexander (whom Pererius praises to 
be the best in explaining Aristotle), commented Aristotle on a rough translation. 
Even the best of them could have made horrible mistakes in their work. Of 
course, teachers have to be acquainted with the effective history of the work on 
which they are commenting, and with the author’s other works as well.  
Although the task of exposing an author’s doctrine appears to be less proposi-
tive than creating one’s own (the teacher seems to be committed to digging into 
the author’s text, rather than to creating and exposing his own doctrine), Pere-
rius argues for the teachers’ active role in disposing and commenting on the au-
thor’s work. This activity is precisely what most clearly reveals Pererius’ attitude 
for an individual philosophy that is not servile to any authority. The teachers 
have firstly to point out the aim, or goal, of the author, and to connect each topic 
of the work to this general aim. Then, Pererius states a weird proposition con-
cerning the concept of order:  
Deinde universam tractationem illius in aliquot praecipua capita distribuere, 
eorumque inter se connexionem et seriem atque totius doctrinae methodum et 
ordinem explicare.17 
                                           





Thus, Pererius seems here to require a juxtaposition of the interpreter’s own or-
der to that of the author. Even if this operation were to be extremely respectful 
of the order followed by the author, the interpreter would add titles that belong 
to his own authorship, but that are not present in the author’s original work. 
Pererius’ usage of the expression «doctrinae methodum et ordinem» in this 
proposition is not clear in itself, because it could either refer to the connection of 
the topics within the entire work or to a more specific reference to the logical 
rules adopted by the author in arguing his doctrines.  
When Pererius comes to sketching the task of explaining the second kind of au-
thor, the meaning of this expression becomes clearer. The teacher who has to ex-
plain the work of an author who wrote his own doctrines without commenting 
on someone else, should observe quite a similar order to the one who has to 
comment on an interpreter: he should point out the main goal of the work and 
divide it into main titles, in order to make it easier for one to orient himself. 
Nevertheless, the teacher should be careful in paying attention to another list of 
issues pertaining to the work, which is not necessary to inquire into a work of an 
interpreter: 
 
Qua in re quatuor consideranda erunt: unum est inventio, alterum dispositio, 
tertium elocutio, quartum nonnullae circumstantiae quae unicuique scriptioni 
extrinsecus adiunctae sunt.18 
 
According to Pererius, method belongs to the same category as disposition. He 
states that «dispositio seu methodus» is twofold: it can pertain to either doctrine 
or prudence. In fact, the latter can be oratorical, poetical, or historical. Conse-
quently, one should find out what kind of method the author used, and also if 
he succedeed in doing so.  
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Ibid., 679. 




On the contrary, the method of doctrine pertains to the composition, division (that 
is, definition), or solution. Pererius curiously cites Galen as an authority on this 
topic, according to whom these categories are present as well as clearly separat-
ed in each constituted discipline. Although he does not mention here the con-
cept of “order”, it is quite clear that he is referring to it when he states that one 
should verify that the author begins with what is more known and common-
place, more certain and evident to us; that is, with the causes and principles of 
things, the simplest and most perfect of things. This is properly one of the defi-
nitions of the ordo doctrinae mentioned above. And it is here blended carelessly 
with the concept of method, which usually belongs to the field of Rhetoric (and 
Logic). So, the usage that Pererius makes previously of the twofold expression 
«doctrinae methodum et ordinem» seems to echo the couplets of words that 
scholastic scholars frequently used almost as synonyms (i.e. conexio & series). In 
this case, method refers to the rhetorical rules and figures used in argumenting, 
while order refers to the proper succession of arguments. In relation to the latter 
concept, Pererius suggests, for instance, that one should find out whether, at the 
beginning, the author has introduced the issues he is going to discuss, and 
whether he has explained their connection and order. Concerning method, Pere-
rius suggests to determine whether the author has used metabasis (which, ac-
cording to him, means “transition”), a rhetorical figure that he forbids the use of, 
since it frees the author from following the purposes he has stated at the begin-
ning; and, finally, whether the connection and series of the statements is clear 
and keeps in mind what has been already said and raises the expectations of 
what is coming. One should find out whether the author has observed the 
method in the general distribution of the argumentation, but he criticizes those 
who follow this method too meticulously, applying it to even the smallest of de-
tails. Then, he should examine whether the author has respected all the rules of 




cessive in dividing the issues and whether he has not neglected or dissimulated 
the method required by the issue.19 
Anyway, rather than limiting his suggestions for being a good teacher, Pererius 
points out how to be a good author without being forced to comment on an an-
cient authority (most likely Aristotle). Pererius reveals two sides of the same 
coin: the order that must be followed in teaching and the order that one has to 
follow if he wishes to write a very good book. Both of them seem to be different 
than the order followed by Aristotle. 
 
And that is precisely the point. According to Pererius, the order of rationality 
does not necessarily match Aristotle’s. Thus, the authority of the Stagirite is 
challenged.  
In a manuscript entitled Documenta quaedam perutilia iis qui in studiis philosophiae 
cum fructu et sine ullo errore versari student, Pererius recommends to study and 
follow Aristotle as a guide, because his way of philosophizing is most consistent 
with the nature of our intellect. This way is quite different from the poetical and 
metaphorical way, wrapped in fables and myths, followed by other philoso-
phers. Yet, one should keep in mind the following: 
Ordo & methodus quod in Aristotele singularis fuit & ab omnibus mirifice 
commendatur, et fere est vel resolutionis, vel compositionis, sed ea in disposi-
                                           
19 «Sequitur dispositio seu methodus, quae duplex est: una doctrinae, altera prudentiae. Haec 
vero alia oratoria, alia poetica, alia historica. Videat igitur, utra usus fuerit author et quam be-
ne. Methodus doctrinae alia est compositionis, alia divisionis vel definitionis, alia resolutionis; 
quae si quidem Galeno credimus, cernitur in omnibus disciplinis bene constitutis. Consideret 
igitur, an inceperit ab iis quae sunt magis nota et communia, certa magis ac manifesta nobis, a 
causis et principiis rerum, a simplicioribus aut perfectioribus rebus; an in principio proposue-
rit ea quae tractaturus erat, et seriem atque ordinem eorum ostenderit; an utatur metabasis, 
idest transitione, qua figura, cum aliquid eorum quae initio proposita fuerant, absoulutum 
est, admonemur; et quid iam dictum fuerit, et quid deinceps dicendum sit ut et praeteritorum 
memoria iuvetur et excitetur expectatio sequentium, utrorumque series et connexio appareat. 
Num in generali quidem distributione tractationis methodum servaverit, in singularum au-




tione principalium partium scientiae atque librorum elucet, in singulis autem 
capitibus et disputationibus interdum obscurium et perturbatior est.20  
 
Elsewhere, Pererius reports the same charge to Avicenna, pairing the two au-
thorities with no particular concern for the gap of dignity between them. Thus, 
through calling to the fore Aristotle’s order of reasoning, Pererius shows not on-
ly his loose and fairly personal way of following him, but also his critical atti-
tude toward any authority in philosophy. 
 
5. Pererius’ rankings 
 
Given that Pererius does not follow Aristotle’s order when he writes 
books, it would be fair to expect him not to follow Aristotle’s order in his cours-
es, as well. Yet, things go differently. The manuscripts still extant about his clas-
ses (mostly on Physics, Psychology, and Metaphysics) reveal a teacher very respect-
ful of the Scholastic tradition: expositions of numbered texts from Aristotle’s 
books are intermingled with questions in the form of traditional commentary.21 
Anyway, the problem of the ‘order’ is still alive in these manuscripts, arising 
whenever Pererius has to handle an epistemological issue. It should not surprise 
that the majority of the questions that Pererius faces are intended to outline a 
precise epistemological profile.  
Many scholars have pointed out Pererius’ peculiar way of ranking and defining 
the disciplines. Long before Francisco Suárez would propose his own tripartion 
of metaphysics, Pererius had divided the first science into two parts, naming the 
first one “prima philosophia” and sketching the second one as a rational theolo-
gy. According to Lohr, Pererius’ division was one of the outcomes of an episte-
mological reassessment which had started in the University of Valencia and 
                                           
20 Documenta quaedam perutilia, c. 26r. 




soon spread all around Spain, where metaphysics had been taught in the course 
of Theology since the Medieval Age.22  
I leave aside a discussion on this topic, because it is impertinent to the aim of 
this paper. What I would like to point out here is that this “revolution” was 
made possibile by some authors that started to write books no longer in the 
commentary fashion but, per methodum doctrinae, that is, as an organic whole de-
rived from the first principles of philosophy. Pererius was one the scholars who 
undertook the task of writing and thinking according to their own logic. The cri-
teria adopted by Pererius in dividing metaphysics and theology have heavy re-
percussions on the order of the other disciplines. Pererius had in mind his own 
concept of science, neither servile nor bound to the scholastic tradition.  
This is quite fair about the relation he states between physics and mathematics. 
And it is interesting to cite here what he taught about psychology in a course on 
De anima: 
Scientia de anima est nobilissima et post mathematica scientia de anima est 
certissima omnium, (…) quod scientia de anima est certior metaphysicae.  
(…) 
Falsum est quod scientiae mathematicae habeant suam certitudinem propter 
abstractionem, nam verum est quod non possent considerari entia mathemati-
ca nisi abstracte, nam certitudinis non est abstractio, sed est ex natura propria 
ipsius rei.23 
 
So, what are the orders of disciplines as proposed by Pererius? One should use 
the plural expression (‘order-s’) because there are at least three different ways to 
rank the disciplines. These are veiled by the question of which discipline is prior, 
certior, & nobilior. For instance, theoretical philosophy is prior to practical philos-
ophy because of the nature of intellect’s work. Indeed, the intellect’s very first 
operation is the cognitio simpliciter; therefore, it comes before the cognitio practica. 
Secondly, Pererius states that theoretical sciences are priores to the practical ones 
                                           
22 LOHR 1988, 608-609.  




because of their subject: «Nam in Metaphysica agitur de Deo & intelligentiis; in 
Physica, de caelis & elementis, quas res natura priores esse his rebus quas tract-
ant scientiae practicae, per se manifestus est».24 In order to  resolve his doubt 
about the priority of the theoretical philosophy according to us (‘secundum nos’), 
Pererius also faces the question about which of the two kinds of disciplines was 
first invented by men. It is simple for Pererius to demostrate that theoretical phi-
losophy is more certain and noble than the moral one, even though others ar-
gued that mathematics is less worthy than ethics because of its subject matter 
(namely, human happiness versus quantity). Yet, according to Pererius, despite 
its subject, mathematics is more praiseworthy than ethics because of its method. 
 
What about the ranking of the disciplines which stand in both of the main gen-
res (theoretical and practical)? 
Pererius lingers on the sense of the tripartion of the theoretical sciences in meta-
physics, natural philosophy, and mathematics, but he has no doubt about which 
of them is the most certain and noble, that is, metaphysics. Yet, this does not 
mean that metaphysics can be automatically considered the first of them. Pere-
rius has to disambiguate the word ‘first’ in order to affirm the general priority of 
metaphysics to the other disciplines.  
In fact, ‘first’ means something pertaining to either the nature of a science or the 
order of men’s learning. So, thanks to the ambiguity still extant in the definition 
of metaphysics, it is easy for Pererius to demonstrate the priority of the nature of 
metaphysics:  its subjects are predicates, first and general causes of all things, 
transcendentals and transcendent beings. On the contrary, according to Pererius 
metaphysics is the last in the order of men’s learning (the order of doctrine), 
since 
 
                                           




homines enim iam cognitis & perceptis ab iis rebus, tandem ad extremum, per-
veniunt ad notitiam rerum divinarum propter summam summam earum difficul-
tatem, & remotionem a sensibus nostris (…) & quoniam in multis praesupponit cog-
nitionem aliarum scientiarum, praesertim autem Physicae.25   
 
In conclusion, metaphysics comes first. What about physics and mathematics? 
Pererius states clearly that mathematics comes first in relation to both the orders: 
1) according to us, because its principles are evident both in themselves and to 
us: in fact, they do not need a great experience to be learned. This is proved by 
the fact that children can easily learn mathematics, while they have problems in 
advancing in physics; and 2) in its own nature, because mathematics considers 
quantity as quantity, while physics considers movement and the sensible, which 
presupposes quantity. 
Speculative disciplines are all set. In relation to the practical ones, Pererius lists 
the order of doctrine as follows: Ethics, Politics, and Economy, following the ar-
gument according to which principles always precede their applications and the 
whole always precedes the part. Pererius leaves aside Logic from this philosoph-
ical ranking, contrasting the Platonic and Stoic statement of the philosophical 
nature of Logic. He argues that philosophy, as meant in his order, is that which 
deals with real being (ens realis), but Logic does not deal with it;  hence, it has to 
be excluded. Secondly, Pererius reasserts a traditional statement about logic, 
stating that logic is not a philosophical discipline, but philosophy’s instrument.26 
 
 What about the ordo doctrinae as pertaining to gnoseology? Pererius draws a 
general rule from Aristotle’s Physics, aimed at distinguishing what is known ‘ac-
cording to us’ from what is known by itself (secundum naturam): the first kind of 
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things is what is reached by human senses, while the second kind embraces 
what is prior with respect to the causal relation27. 
This rule leads him to confute the Stoicist gnoseology and to draw a clear profile 
of man’s order of learning: 
Nos enim multa prius cognoscimus, quae, si natura rerum spectetur, posterius 
cognosci deberent, si quidem ante percipimus accidens, quam substantiam, at 
substantia per se ac suapte natura vehitur atque ducitur ad sciendum. Homo 
enim naturaliter expetit scire non quocunque modo, sed per caussas, talis enim 
scientia est perfectio intellectus humani explens atque saturans naturalem ap-
petitum eius. Itaque homo naturaliter expetit res cognoscere per ea quae sunt 
priora & notiora secundum naturam, seu per caussas, potius quam per ea quae 
sunt notiora secundum nos, veluti per effectus. Nec denique nuncupant natu-
ralis, quod ita sit homini insita & infixa, ut ab ea nunquam divelli & separari 
possit. Nam quamvis rudes & indocti cum primum aggrediuntur ad cogno-
scendas res, hanc intelligendi rationem sequantur, tamen qui sunt foecundo & 
subtili ingenio & in scientiis exercitati, cognoscunt res convenienter naturae ip-
sarum, & quod secundum naturam prius atque notius est, illis quoque prius & 
magis notum habetur.28 
 
Pererius adds a distinction to Aquinas’ explanation of the second text of Aristo-
tle’s Physics. In his commentary, Aquinas did not mention, indeed, the difference 
between an ordinary learner and a talented one. This is a pedagogical statement 
that Pererius draws from his own concept of ‘order’, which neither Aquinas nor 
the Greek interpreters, whom Pererius likes the most, stated. 
Who is so talented as to think in the very same way of nature? Pererius does not 
directly answer this question, but it is quite likely that he took himself to be one 
of those people. The table of contents of the De principiis mirrors the order of 
things secundum naturam;  therefore, writing it meant to think in the very same 
way as nature. What does this chiefly mean? It means that the talented philoso-
                                           
27 «Quaecunque cadunt sub sensu[m], vel sunt propinqua sensibus, sunt nota nobis; quae vero 
a sensibus remota sunt, habentur ignota & quo magis minusve sensus nostros attingunt vel 
refugiunt, eo magis minusve nota aut ignota iudicari debent: At nota secundum naturam vel 
simpliciter, censeri debent quaecunque sunt priora, & a quibus pendent alia: e contrario vero 
quae sunt posteriora, & manant atque pendent ab aliis, sunt ignota secundum naturam». 
(PERERIUS 1585, 129). 




pher can recognize the rational order of the things in this world and speculate 
according to their proper order, without any apprenticeship or servile following 
of an order imposed on him by any philosophical authority, including that of 
Aristotle (and Aquinas, if you will). 
 
The recognizable rational order of this world is then again confirmed by Pere-
rius as a theologian. Commenting on the verse Vidit Deus cuncta quae fecerat, & 
erant valde bona (Gen., 13), he states: 
Huic varietati adiuncta est quasi comes, principalis mundi decor & ornamen-
tum, ordo, & aptissima pulcherrimaque rerum omnium dispositio: qua si 
careret mundus, ne ille quo vastior mole esset, plenioque atque multiformior, 
eo sane deformior esset ad speciem, ad motum impeditior, impotentior ad ef-
fectum, ad sui tutelam invalidior, & ad diuturnitatem infirmior. Ordo autem 
mundi in eo cernitur, quod omnes eius partes aptum sibi congruentemque lo-
cum tenent & servant, quod pro ratione nobilitatis & dignitatis rerum, aliae res 
sunt inferiores, aliae superiores, quaedam inter has mediae, & aliae per alias 
aguntur, serbantur, ac reguntur. Hunc ordinem tanti aestimavit Aristoteles, ut 
extremo Met. libro duodecimo, maximum & supremum Universi bonum, in 
ordine & dispositione collocaverit.29 
 
Curiously, the philosophical authority cited in this passage by Pererius to en-
dorse his doctrine on the rational order of the world is the same from whose or-
der Pererius is moving away. 
 
6. Pererius and the authority 
 
Pererius’ relation to philosophical authority is still a historiographical di-
lemma.30 Rather than being blame for laying himself away from the traditional 
Aristotelian order of reasoning, Pererius was accused by Ledesma and Gagliardi 
to be an Averroist and to spread the empious Commentaor’s doctrine all around 
the Society. But, was that true? 
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Actually, the Ratio Studiorum enjoined the professor of philosophy to neither 
praise nor cite authors hostile to Christianity, but stopped short of imposing a 
total censureship: such a prohibition would in practice have been counterpro-
ductive, sparking a contrary curiosity in the students and an interest in the for-
bidden. An awareness of such a risk is evident when the Ratio warns the teacher 
to be on the alert to check students' enthusiasm for such authors, and for one au-
thority in particular who was more than any other deemed contrary to the 
Christian faith, Averroës. Of course, what sixteenth century Averroism amounts 
to is an open question, more perhaps an occasion for polemic than a school of 
thought31, and to call any sixteenth century author, even Zimara, Averroist, is 
problematic. None the less, a number of telling criticisms were mounted in the 
name of Averroës or of Alexander of Aphrodisias against certain of Thomas 
Aquinas's arguments (his demonstration of the immortality of the soul for ex-
ample), particularly in an Italian context where secularising Aristotelianism had 
found fertile ground. It is natural therefore that Jesuits teaching or studying at 
the Collegio Romano or the College at Padua should, by the above-mentioned 
process of adaptation to local circumstances, have been susceptible to the allure, 
even when the doctrines of these two Aristotelian commentators involved a de-
nial of the immortality or individuality of the soul. Such a tendency is clearly 
behind the structure in the Ratio Studiorum which outlaws praise of the commen-
tator, while allowing that he may be the author of some good doctrines. The 
teacher «should not deal separately with Averroës's divagations (and the same 
should be true of similar authors); but if he needs to cite some good passage 
from his works, he should do so without praising him; and if possible show that 
he derived it from others». 
 
 In 1567 the same controversy blew up in Germany, with the Canisius brothers 
                                           




(one the Provincial, the other a college rector) together opposing the excessive 
freedom with which certain students, returning from the Collegio Romano, had 
taken to promoting Averroës's theories, apostrophising him as "divine" and dis-
daining Aquinas. The underlining motivation was that the Canisiuses felt that 
the struggle against the Protestants was being undermined, as the latter were be-
ing presented with an opening for accusing the Catholics of propagating atheist 
doctrines. In 1568 the provincial Congregation of Upper Germany declared: «We 
greatly desire that a severe law be promulgated throughout the whole Society, 
so that the opinion of either Averroes or any other philosopher that fights with 
the Christian faith or with the common doctrine of the schools in any respect 
may not be defended or confirmed».32  The controversy was further inflamed by 
the protests of Antonio Balduino, a pupil of Pererius's recently arrived in 
Dilingen to teach Logic, against the Canisiuses' severity. But when Peter Canisi-
us was succeeded as Provincial by the less zealous Paul Hoffaeus, the waters 
calmed. 
The anti-Averroist ruckus at the Collegio Romano illuminates not only the Jesuits' 
relationship with Averroës but more generally the attitudes many of them dis-
played in their dealings with less “sound” auctoritates. A series of documents 
drawn up between 1564 and 1565 by professors at the Collegio Romano33 detail 
the criticisms levelled, notably by Diego de Ledesma and Achille Gagliardi, at 
the Averroism allegedly propounded by Pererius while he held the chair in dia-
lectics. Of these documents, a Relatio de Professorum Consultationibus circa Collegi 
Romani Studia in particular deals specifically with the question of Averroism, 
among others. This puts on the record in a single document the statements of 
several teachers including Ledesma, Gagliardi, Toleto, Iacobus Acosta, Manuel 
de Sá, Perpinyà, but excludes Pererius himself, and states that Mariana had re-
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fused to express himself on the matter. As far as Averroës is concerned, these 
rehearse the usual formula of forbidding teachers to praise him, as an infidel, 
and enjoining them to eulogise instead Aquinas and Albertus Magnus. The 
teacher must not show himself an Averroist, nor favour the Greek commentaries 
at the expense of the Latin. For Ledesma though the problem was not clear-
cut  «in teaching philosophy a twofold abuse should be avoided: first, too much 
liberty, which indeed harms the faith, as experience shows in the academies of 
Italy; second, that people are bound to the doctrine of just one or another author. 
This has produced hateful and contemptible things in Italy».34  He returned to 
the theme in the same year (1564) in two documents, in the first of which he also 
dwells on pedagogical strategies for expounding the material (the teacher must 
explain things in such a way that a mediocre intellect can follow), while in the 
second he provides a list of philosophical doctrines to be taught and champi-
oned alongside a list of erroneous doctrines as propounded (presumably) by 
Pererius or found in the students' notes. While his supposed Averroism has 
been reappraised35, and the polemicising with Ledesma and Gagliardi shown to 
be largely motivated by internal rivalries, it still cannot be denied that Pererius's 
philosophical position was openly favourable to the commentator. 
But what exactly were the doctrines in dispute between Ledesma and Pererius? 
A look at the propositions the former contests gives a fairly clear picture of the 
anti-Averroist position, largely connected to the question of the rational soul, 
which the Averroists equated with the undivided intellect: 1) the soul is an as-
sistens but not informing form of the body, given that, the soul being immortal 
and the body mortal, it cannot free itself of the latter if integral. 2) science is not 
applicable to the separated soul. 3) nor to its operations in that state. 4) neither 
can we know whether the rational soul be an aspect of the body. 5) nor whether 
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it existed before the body or how it is made. 6) it is not necessary to deal with 
reasoning against faith, nor is it appropriate to bolster faith with rational argu-
ment. 7) form is the whole of quidditas. 8) in man there are three souls, the vege-
tative, the sensitive and the rational. 9) the blood and the humours are not inte-
gral parts of the human body (with reference to the theological problem of tran-
substantiation). 
Ledesma then adds a few further arguments with the insinuation that Pererius 
had co-opted the authority of the Superior General Laynez to justify them: 1) Ar-
istotle believed the soul to be mortal and denied divine providence, and on this 
count, Laynez empahsises, was condemned by all the early Doctors of the 
Church. 2) again according to Laynez the question “If the soul is immortal, why 
is it attached to a mortal body?” is irresolvable by the natural light of reason. 
Ledesma then winds up with the accusation that Pererius exalts Aquinas insuffi-
ciently and indeed frequently challenges him, along with the Latin authorities 
generally.36   
These propositions mirror those in the two lists proposed by Ledesma in the 
same document regarding the doctrines to be taught or defended by the teacher. 
In these lists Ledesma adds several propositions to the effect that each soul is 
unique to one and every man, and that the actual and potential intellects are ca-
pacity's of the soul and not substances distinct from man. On the proper attitude 
towards auctoritates, Ledesma upholds the necessity of revering Aquinas but 
does not exclude, any more than the Constitutions or, following these, the Ratio 
Studiorum, that the teacher may differ from him on certain points, while remain-
ing humble and tentative so as not to alienate the students from Thomas's doc-
trines. Masters must never belittle their colleagues' teachings, nor the Latin au-
thorities vis-à-vis the Greek. 
It is possible that the principle head of disagreement between the position taken 
                                           




here by Ledesma, but espoused equally by Gagliardi and Canisio, and that of 
Pererius, is really just this question of the basic attitude expected of the teacher, 
which for Pererius was a matter of philosophising freely and eclecticism.37 In a 
paper entitled De Modo Legendi Philosophiam (1564), Pererius in fact agrees with 
Ledesma in requiring modesty and open-mindedness of the master, while add-
ing that his teaching should be conducted in an orderly and firm manner. Pere-
rius also affords us an interesting glimpse at what was meant at that time by 
«new opinions», which all the Jesuit documents warn against partiality towards. 
When Pererius seconds this advice to the teacher he does so saying: «He should 
not be fond of new opinions, that is, those discovered by himself»38. This is use-
ful in its framing of novelty, which here refers exclusively to the elaboration of a 
personal doctrine not underpinned by either ancient or contemporary authori-
ties. For one of the goals of the whole Society regarding philosophical doctrine, 
apart from that ever elusive uniformity, was up-to-dateness, in the form of «ac-
ceptability by the large scientific community».39  
The open-mindedness Pererius demanded of a philosophy master he himself ex-
tended even to those authors who, like Averroës, might seem quite controversial 
doctrinally: «Reading Averroës is most useful, both for his teachings, and for the 
reputation he enjoys in Italy; and to understand him, read his followers, such as 
Janduno, Barleo, Paulo Veneto, Zimarra, Nipho».40  
Similarly the master should engage with the commentaries of Alexander of 
Aphrodisias, Simplicius of Cilicia and Themistius, alongside, naturally, the more 
generally accepted ones of Albertus Magnus and Aquinas. Further, in his Expla-
natio Prologi Averrois introducing his lecture on the Analitica Posteriora, Pererius 
states his disagreement with «those who for trivial motives deny the greatness 
                                           
37 BLUM 2006, 281. 
38 LUKÁCS 1974, 667. 
39 BLUM 2006, 284. 




of Averroës's commentaries, who is called Great not for his prolixity but for the 
vastness of his learning and doctrines»41It is possible that this eclectic self-
positioning of Pererius's was intended to meet the particular demands of an Ital-
ian humanist public, but elsewhere he returns specifically to underlining Aver-
roës's value to Jesuit philosophical education, distancing himeslf from his col-
leagues at the Collegio Romano. Called upon to comment on a draft of the Ratio 
Studiorum in 1586, each of the provinces and the principal colleges sent in their 
comments in the form of a deposition. While the other European provinces 
made no mention of the problem of Averroës, and we can assume they ap-
proved the critical assessment that carried through to the final 1599 version of 
the Ratio, both the Jesuits of the Veneto province and the professors of the Colle-
gio Romano made specific representations. The former, perhaps alarmed by the 
secularising ambience of the University of Padua, approved the draft's anti-
Averroist formulae in principle but were concerned that specific proscription 
might have the opposite effect on the students, stimulating an interest in the 
disparaged Averroës. The latter shared the psychological concerns of the Vene-
tians but also felt obliged to register Pererius's caveat. Specifically they say:  «De 
Averroe: Placet totus ut iacet; excepto P. Pererio, cui videntur quaecunque et in 
Averroe et in aliis gentilibus vere dicta sunt, simpliciter esse citanda atque do-
cenda; praesertim cum in digressionibus Averrois uberior soleat esse philoso-
phiae doctrina».42  
In 1565 the third Superior General, Francis Borgia, responding to the controver-
sy surrounding Pererius's Averrosim, had published a list of forbidden proposi-
tions, among them the mortality of the soul. With his death in 1572, followed by 
that of his old adversary Ledesma in 1575, Pererius's position improved some-
what.  
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But, how did he really feel about Averroes and other philosophical authorities? 
When he wrote the Preface to his masterpiece, Pererius states clearly that Aver-
roes is one the best interpreters of Aristotle’s thought, as is Alexander of Aphro-
disias. Yet, since Averroes did not know the original language of Aristotle’s 
book, namely the Greek, sometimes he makes even serious mistakes about the 
understanding of Aristotle43. This statement leads Pererius to point out a general 
rule for the philosophers:  
Quid igitur magis a Philosophiae gravitate, digntitateque remotum, & alienum 
esse potest, quam Philosophum, id est amatorem sapientiae, quem ad hanc re-
rum omnium universitatem animo perlustrandam, atque contemplandam, so-
lutum, & liberum esse decet, unius hominis, non omnium mortalium sapi-
entissimi, quasi utile mancipium, &, ut Poëta quidam ait, servuum pecus effi-
ci?44 
 
According to Pererius, the same underlying proverb (“Amicus Plato sed magis 
amica Veritas”) works for Aristotle as an authority. Even not clearly stated in his 
published works, this statement is recurrent in Pererius’ courses manuscripts, 
and in the document entitled Documenta quaedam perutilia…, I cited before.  
In the last, Pererius, reminds his reader that Aristotle is a great classic, in such a 
way that reading his books means always  to find out something new. Yet, in re-
lation with aristotelian doctrines that could be in contrast with Christian faith, 
Pererius shows in open words what he thinks about Aristotle’s relation to truth, 
and about the opportunity of bounding a philosopher to Aristotle’s doctrines: 
«Cum Aristoteles more aliorum hominum, et potuerit errare et interdum er-
raverit, tum in hoc tum in alijs rebus, non est mirandum veritatem fidei pugnare 
cum erroribus Aristotelis».45 
                                           
43 «Negari tamen non potest, Averroem, interpretando Aristotelem, ob ignorationem linguae 
Graecae, mendososque codices, & bonorum interpretum penuriam, multifariam hallucinatum 
esse» (PERERIUS 1585, c. 3v). 
44 Ibidem. 





In conclusion, rather than a follower or an enemy of a particular ancient philos-
opher, Pererius seems to be an enemy of the authority in itself.  The gap between 
the concept of philosophical authority and the moral or institutional authority is 
narrow.  This is very likely what Ledesma and Gagliardi foresaw in Pererius’ 
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